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ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondents in the above cases having obtained an 
Order from the Court authorizing them to file a con-
solidated petition for rehearing, appellants have like-
2 
wise consolidated the cases for the purpose of answer-
ing such a petition. 
We have carefully read the several arguments re-
lied on by counsel in seeking to obtain a rehearing of 
the instant cases, but find nothing therein which was 
not before the court and considered by it in rendering 
its decision herein. The four grounds set forth in Res-
pondents' brief re-affirm the position taken in previous 
briefs filed herein in very similar language. However, 
the court has accepted Appellants' theory of the case 
as being the proper one. At the risk of duplicating many 
of our arguments heretofore submitted to the court, we 
shall proceed to answer Respondents' points in the 
order set forth in their brief. 
However, we deem it necessary to comment on the 
"Re-statement of Facts" set forth in the petition for 
rehearing before discussing the main issues. On page 
4 of petitioners' brief, appears the following statement: 
"The (premium payments) were not a part of or in any 
manner reflected in or related to any sale or any con-
sideration for a sale or conversion into money of the 
ores or metals." This is a conclusion of the petitioners-
not a stipulated fact. Nor did thitol court by its opinion 
rendered herein reach this conclusion from the stipulated 
facts. 
On the contrary, appellants have at all times main-
tained that premium payments were related to the sale 
of the ores in question and were made as a part of, and 
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in consideration of, such sale. The premium payments 
were received by the various mining companies as par-
tial consideration for the ores which they produced. We, 
of course, admit that the actual time of payment by 
Metals Reserve Company did not coincide with the time 
of the payment by the smelting companies on their 
smelting contracts, but we opine that petitioners would 
not contend that the time of payment was the factor 
which determined whether premium payments were or 
were not related to the sale or formed a part of the con-
sideration for the sale or conversion of the ores into 
money. Such an argument would be ridiculous in the light 
of modern time financing where payments for the pur-
chase of goods, wares and merchandise are often post-
poned and staggered over a long period of time. 
As will hereafter appear the entire plan (including 
the fixing of ceiling prices and the payment of premiums) 
was one of ''differential pricing for the purpose of in-
creasing non-ferrous metals output." See Amici Curiae 
brief, Appendix p. 43. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CONSTRUCTION BY THE COURT OF 
SECTION 80-5-57 SO AS TO INCLUDE "PREMIUM 
PAYMENTS" AS A PART OF THE "GROSS PRO-
CEEDS'' DOES NOT RENDER SUCH SECTION UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING UNREASONABLE 
OR INEQUITABLE. 
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In this connection petitioners argue that "to in-
clude payments made . . . in gross proceeds is neces-
sarily to hold that the greater the costs of production 
the more valuable a mine." This same position was taken 
by counsel in their brief heretofore filed, and was fully 
answered by the supplemental brief which appellants 
filed in this case. Petitioners apparently failed to dif-
ferentiate between "gross proc<'eds" and "net pro-
ceeds.'' As always, the greater the cost of pruduetion, 
the smaller will be the net proceeds from the mining 
operation. The fact that one mining company receives 
greater gt·oss pr1oceeds does not in any wiRe indicate that 
its n,et proceeds will also be greater. And since the valua-
tion of a mine is based upon its net proceeds in any one 
calender year, there can be no justification for the ar-
gument that the greater the costs of produdion the more 
valuable a mine. 
\Ve arc apparently all agreed that when the Legis-
lature enacted the "Net Proceeds" statute, it intended 
to lay down a practical formula for arriving at the 
value of a mine or mining claim. The formula is not 
only practical, it is also relatively simple. It requires to 
be included on the one hand all monies received by the 
mining company-the gross realized-"from the pro-
duet of the mine,'' while permitting the mining company 
to deduct from such gross proceeds certain ''costs and 
expen;:;cs of obtaining such proceeds awl converting the 
same into money." Mercur Gold l\[ining & Milling Com-
pany v. Spry, 16 Utah 22, 52 P. 382. 
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We can think of numerous illustrations where the 
application of such a formula would in a given year im-
pose a heavier tax upon a mining company which might 
otherwise have less ore reserves. However, the valuation 
of a mine is not determined by its ore reserves nor by 
the value and extent of its improvements, except as these 
factors may be reflected in the annual profit derived 
from the operation of the mine. Should a mining com-
pany (for the purpose of impressing its stockholders or 
for some other reason personal to itself) decide to drain 
its ore reserves as much as possible in a given year with-
out at the same time carrying on necessary development 
work, and thereby show a large profit from its mining 
operation for such year, its valuation for taxation pur-
poses may be considerably higher than a neighboring 
mine that may have carried out the policy of conserving 
its ore resources to the end that it produced little ore 
and showed only a small profit. As a matter of fact, a 
mining company which failed to operate its mine at all 
during a particular calendar year might have no net 
proceeds for valuation purposes. Under such circum-
stances its mine and mining claims would be assessed at 
$5.00 per acre although the value of such mining claims 
and mine would far exceed that. 
We feel that what has been said by this court on this 
subject in its opinion heretofore rendered in these cases 
is well reasoned and is supported by ample authority. 
This court expressed itself as follows: 
''Because one mine, whether because of more 
efficient management, better mining equipment, 
stoping up for ores as distinguished from hoist-
ing from low levels, shorter hauls, richer ores, or 
better smelter contract, has larger net proceeds 
per ton of ore mined than has another, mining 
the same kinds of metals, does not make the 
assessments discriminatory nor does it result in 
lack of uniformity. It does result in assessing 
one mine at a greater value than the other be-
cause it has a greater net return, a greater pro-
fit, more dividends, and that is an important item 
in the determination of value of mining proper-
ty." 
The argument is again made that because the Legis-
lature could not have known when the statute defining 
"net proceeds" was passed that some day the Federal 
Government would regulate and control prices of metals, 
including the payment of "premiums," it must now 
be concluded that such premiums are not a part of the 
proceeds reali?Jed ''from the product of the mine.'' As 
contended by counsel it is the duty of this court in con-
struing and interpreting legislative acts "to give effect 
to the intent of the Legislature and to avoid an interpre-
tation which would lead to an impractical, unfair or un-
reasonable result. Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 
Utah 70, 97 P. (2d) 937." The court in its opinion in 
the present cases determined that the interpretation given 
to the statute by the Tax Commission "tends to equalize 
and render uniform the tax base and assessment;" that 
the interpretation urged by the mining companies would 
lead to an impractical, unfair or unreasonable result. We 
desire again, at the risk of being repititious to quote 
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the definition of "net proceeds" which has been accepted 
in this State since 1898 when the case of Mercur Gold 
Mining and Milling Company v. Spry, supra, was de-
cided: 
''By the term 'net annual proceeds of the 
mine' is meant what is annually realized from 
the product of the mine, over and above all the 
costs and expenses of obtaining such proceeds and 
converting the same into money.'' 
While the statute has been amended from time to 
time since that date relative to the deductions permitted 
in arriving at "net proceeds" the above definition of 
"proceeds" as being "what is annually realized from 
the product of the mine'' remains the true criterion. 
With such a definition having been made by the court, 
the Legislature in 1919 did not need to envisage any 
"premium payment" program. It did contemplate that 
the proceeds realized or derived from the ores produced 
by a mining company, as distinguished from any pro-
ceeds which it might receive from developing water, 
operating a store or boarding house, would be considered 
as part of the ''gross proceeds' 1 and thence into ''net 
proceeds' 1 from which the valuation of such mine or 
mining claim would be calculated. The legislature used 
ordinary, common words to indicate its intent to include 
all such proceeds as are received from the ore output. 
We do not know how more comprehensive, all-inclusive 
language could have been used. It was not necessary, 
as contended by the mining companies, to state specifi-
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cally: ''including the Federal Government in the nature 
of a subsidy or bonus for operations." (See Brief of 
Amici Curiae, page 34.) 
II. 
THE COUHT DID NOT DISREGARD }IATI-G-
RIAL F AC'rS STIPULATJ<JD TO B~TWJ1jEN THI-c 
PARTIES. 
It is true that the parties stipulated that in some in-
stances premium payments ''are made in advance of a 
sale of ores or the metals recovered from ores; in other 
instances such payments are made after sale of the ores.'' 
(Schedule "A," p. 23). However, it might just as well 
have been stipulated that the purchase price of the ores 
was received in two payments, since that actually was 
the way it was done. In no instance were premium pay-
ments made until the ores had been delivered to the 
smelter for smelting or refining, thereby, as stated in 
the eourt 's opinion, placing the metals in "such form 
that they have a ready market at definite or readily 
determinable prices so that at any time the miner can 
dispose of them and receive the money therefor." As 
such the metals have been converted into the equivalent 
of money as defined in the case of Salt Lake County v. 
Utah Copper, 93 F. (2d) 127. 
'L'ake the situation of the United States Smelting Re-
fining and Mining Company: A copy of an affidavit filed 
by that company appears on page 21 of Schedule ''A.'' 
In that affidavit Mr. F'. S. Mulock as Vice President and 
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General Manager of the company states that the com-
pany has "produced and delivered to itself and Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Company at their Custom 
Milling-Lead & Copper plants known as Midvale Plant, 
Garfield Plant, respectively, . . . during the month of 
October, 1943, the quantities of copper, lead, and zinc 
hereinafter listed ... That its monthly production quota, 
as hereinafter stated, has been filled and the amount of 
material specified therein has been produced and de-
livered for sale during the month above mentioned.'' 
The instructions given by Metals Reserve Company 
to the smelting companies in connection with the latter 
acting as agent for the purpose of making premium pay-
ments are enlightening on this matter. As set forth at 
pages 17 A and 17B of Schedule ''A,'' these instructions 
read in part as follows: 
"During any given month you will settle with 
the producers in accordance with your contracts 
with them, and pursuant to your usual practice. 
Following the end of each month, each producer 
will furnish you a sworn affidavit (in the form 
of Exhibit" A" hereto attached) showing, among 
other things, the amount of each metal (in excess 
of his quota for that metal) contained in the 
material delivered by him to your works during 
the month in question for which (in accordance 
with your settlement sheets) he has been paid 
the market price and on which he is eligible for 
a premium from MRC. 
'' MRC will make funds available promptly 
to enable you to make the premium payments to 
the respective producers, following receipt from 
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you monthly by the Traffic Manager of MRC 
of (1) a statement setting out the name of each 
producer fmm whom excess production has been 
b,ought during the month covered by the state-
ment, the total arrvo'l1!nt of metals oontained in 
materi-al received during the month for whick 
paymen.t has been made or will be made to such 
producer, and the amount of such metals which, 
being excess production, is eligible for a premium, 
and (2) the producers' affidavits ... 
"Upon receipt of such funds you will pay to 
each producer, on behalf of MRC, as a premium 
on his metals in excess of quota, a sum equal 
to the difference between the market price (ceil-
ing price) for the respective metals (which will 
have theretofore been paid to him by you under 
his contract) and the equivalent of seventeen 
cents ( 17 c) per pound Connecticut Valley for 
eopper, nine and one-fourth cents (91,4c) per 
pound New York for lead, and eleven cents (llc) 
per pound East St. Louis for zinc.'' (Italics 
added.) 
As set forth m the table contained on page :n of 
the same schedule, in the case of each mining company, 
the gross proceeds reported were based on smelter 
returns except in the case of Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration, which reports its sales of metal in the open 
market. As indicated above, the premium payments 
were made on a basis of such smelter returns also. 
The court therefore properly concluded that such pay-
ments were a part of the gross proceeds received from 
the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of 
the ores produced by the respective mining companies. 
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An additional factor, not heretofore presented to the 
court, which in our opinion sustains the decision ren-
dered, is contained in the Senate Sub-Committee Pre-
liminary Report, pursuant to Senate Resolution 66. 
"Rather full extracts are reprinted for the benefit of 
the court" in the appendix to the brief of Amici Curiae. 
In analyzing the "evolution of the plan" the report 
states that considerable price inflation resulted in World 
·war I. "In this war, such price inflation was avoided 
by differential rJricing techniques." 'rhe report further 
states that the premium price plan was "one of the 
most successful of theRe techniques". The "differential 
pricing" was attained by fixing quotas so that one 
mining company would be required to produce more 
ore at a given price than another mining company. As 
one official stated" 'quota adjustments under the Premi-
um Price Plan constitute a flexible instrument for adjust-
ment of mine revenues so as to enable continuous maxi-
mum production in the face of changing circumstances 
which occasion changes in cost, unavoidable decline in 
grade of ore, wage increases, fluctuations in operations 
owing to changes in the manpower situation and the 
like'." (See Appendix, page 45). 
As the plan developed, property was generally 
assigned a quota less than 100% of its 1941 rate of 
production ''and the work of the Quota Committee 
became almost solely the revision of quotas to meet 
changing conditions". In other words, the nature of 
the problem involved became the ''calculation of what 
might be produced with the given labor supply, what 
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that production would cost and what quotas would 
yield sufficient revenue to cover the cost and provide 
an adequate margin". As we have heretofore pointed 
out to the Court even the amount of royalties paid to 
leasers by the mining companies in certain instances 
included premium payments within the basis of settle-
ment. (See, Maximum Price Regulation 356, Schedule 
"B", pp. 39-40.) 
The foregoing statements taken from the Senate 
report indicate, as do the provisions of the pertinent 
statutes, regulations, and proclamations relative to the 
"premium price plan" that premium payments were an 
integral part of the price structure, and as such should 
he included as a part of the gross amount received for 
the ores produced by the several mining companies. 
III. and IV. 
TJUJ PROVISIONS O:F' SEC'riON 81-1-1 AND 
80-3-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATI1JD 1D43 ARE NOT 
INCONSISTI,JN'r 'VI'JlH THE COUHT 'S DFJCISION 
IN THIS ),fATTJ1JR. 
Petitioners claim that this court disregarded the 
provisions of Reetion 81-1-1 with respect to the definition 
of a "sale of g·oods" as being "an agreement whereby 
the seller transfers the property in question to the 
buyer for a eonsideration called the priee" in construing 
the net proeeeds statute so as to include premium pay-
ments as a part of the gross amount received from the 
sale or eonversion into money or its equivalent of the 
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ores produced. As a matter of fact, however, this Sec-
tion has no application to the issues presented in the 
cases before u::;. There is no requirement in the statute 
that all of the money received for the goods be paid 
at one time or that it be paid entirely by one person. 
Respondents here maintain the fact that because 
premium payments were made at a different time than 
the amounts otherwise received is conclusive that Guch 
premium payments were not a part of the gross pro-
C{~eds. Such, of course, is not the law. 
As defi1wd in the case of Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah 
27G, 198 Pae. 772, a ''sale is ordinarily understood to 
mean a transfer of property for money". But, again, 
nothing i::; indicated that the entire consideration for 
the transfer of the property must come from the trans-
feree or that all of such consideration must be paid 
at the time of the transfer. 
Section 80-3-1 defines "value" as being "the amount 
at which the property would be taken in payment of a 
just debt due from a solvent debtor". Mr. Justice 
Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the Occupation Tax 
cases, adequately disposes of petitioners' argument 
herein as follows : 
"Value as meant by the legislature in Sec. 
80-5-66 is no longer extant. The only remaining 
basis is the money received from the sale and 
certainly the money received from the sale is 
the total price which the sale yielded regardless 
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of whether part of it would ultimately or imme-
diately be paid by the Metals Reserve Company 
either directly or indirectly.'' 
~rhe definition of value as set forth m the statute 
was not ignored by the court, but because of its inap-
plicability to the circumstances in the present cases it 
was not discussed in the main opinion. 
v. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISREGARD-
ING THE S'l'ATEMENT 01'' THE PRESIDENT OF 
METALS RESERVE COMPANY. 
As an indication of the weakness of their position, 
m seeking a re-hearing, respondents finally attempt to 
jmpose upon this court the opinion of Charles B. Hen-
derson, chairman of Metals Reserve Company, to the 
effect that "premium payments made by Metals Reserve 
Company are not payments made by that company or 
received by the mining company for the sale or con-
version into money or its equivalent of any ores.'' On 
page 25 of Schedule "A" appears the following stipula-
tion: 
"The Mining Companies caused to be pre-
pared and submitted to Metals Reserve Company 
a memorandum respecting the inclusion of premi-
um payments in 'net proceeds' and in 'mine 
occupation tax'. After examining such memoran-
dum a letter was written by the President of 
Metals Reserve Company to Mr. F. S. Mulock. 
Such memorandum and letter were, upon proper 
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identification, received in evidence by the Com-
mission (but the Commission shall not be bound 
by the facts, inferences or oonclusions therein 
sta.ted) .... " (Italics added.) 
We wonder why counsel did not call the court's 
attention to the opinion of the Attorney General of 
Utah, al~o eontained in Schedule "A" in which the 
conclusion is reached that the premium payments made 
hy 11 etals Reserve Company are ''payments made by 
that Company or received by the mining company for 
the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of 
any onler ". Certainly the latter opinion is more per-
suasin• of nn interpretation of our own taxing statutes. 
However, Mr. Henderson himself stated that Metals 
Reserve Company "has made no study of the provisions 
of the Utah laws relating to taxation of mines, and is 
not in a position to express any opinion concerning 
statements in the memorandum on that subject". He 
thereby appeared quite willing to let our Supreme 
Court pass on the interpretation and construction to be 
given to our own local taxing statutes. We wish that the 
same could he said fm counsel for the various mining 
eompanies who have attempted to bind this court by the 
decisions of the trial courts, both State and Federal, 
all of whieh decisions have been reversed on appeal. 
Having fully answered the art,ruments contained m 
R.espondents' brief on petition for rehearing, we now 
turn to a discussion of the arguments of counsel in the 
brief of Amici Curiae filed in these cases as well as 
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the "occupation tax cases". As outlined in that brief, 
the issues presented for discussion are three-fold: 
(a) Whether the premium payments were a part 
of the ''gross proceeds'' realized from the sale or 
conversion into money or its equivalent o( the ore;:-; mined 
by the various mining companies. 
(b) Whether the premium payments constitute a 
part of the ; 'gross amount received for or tlH' groso: 
value of mctallii'erum; orcs sold''. 
(c) Whether the prewium payments constitute 
"gros::; income" umler thu corporate franchise tax law. 
Of course only tl1e fin;t two of these issues are 
presented in the easm; on which a rehearing is being 
sought by the various mining companie8. 'l'he question 
of whether the premium payments constitute ineome has 
never been raised insofar a:-; we have been able to 
ascertain with respect to any of the partie:-; involved 
m the cases pending before the Supreme Court. 
In considering the nature of the premium payments, 
we eoncur with eounsel that the Federal Government 
fixed prices generally and specifically with respect to 
copper, lead and zinc. We wish to add, however, that 
the Government also fixed the amount of ''premium 
payments" which would be made for each pound of 
copper produced in excess of quota-quotas also being 
fixed by the Federal Government-so that we can say 
without equivocation that the entire sums received by 
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the rnmmg eompanies from their ore were received by 
virtue and under specific regulation of the Federal Gov-
ernment. 
On page 7 of their briPf, Amici Curiae refer to 
thP f.;pnate Sub-Committee preliminary report which is 
printPrl in part in the appendix to the brief commencing 
page 4-1. Connscl term the "premium payment plan" 
a~ '' ooe of the most mal-administered plans put forth 
hy the OovNnment.". This, notwithstanding that the 
mining companies participated wholeheartedly in the 
program and were recipients of considerable sums of 
money from the F(~dpral Government pursuant to such 
plan. 
On page :n of the Stipulation of Facts referreu to 
as Schednlr:> ''A'' will he found the various amounts 
received by the mining companies during the calendar 
year 104~ from l\f etals Reserve Company. The amount 
varie~ from *1,227.85 receiveu by Niagara Mining Com-
pany to $~, 781 ,42l.G5 receivPd by Kennecott Copper 
Corporation. 'rhf~ total amonnt paid by l\f etals Reserve 
Company to the ::;everal Utah mining companies during 
that year is $8,212,:i55.94. There has been no eontention 
made that ~my mining company was compelled to take 
part in the premium payment prngram or to participate 
in its hendits. '!'he fact that every mining company 
did so is an indication that the plan was well founded 
and hronght eonsirlerahlc benefits to the mining industry. 
From 1\n·ther remarks eontained on page 7 of their 
brief, connsel would have ns believe that sales were 
1'8 
actually consummated without reference to premium 
payments. We again refer to Schedule "A" of the 
Stipulation, page 23, to the effect that "in certain 
instanc('H premium payments are made in advance of a 
sale of orcs or the metals recovered from ores; in 
other instances such payments are made after sale 
of the ores". This is not a stipulation that the premium 
payments have no relationship to the Hale or the pur-
chase price. As heretofore indicated and as shown by 
the affidavit of the pro<lncer filed for th<' purpose of 
qualifying for premium payments, sucl1 producer states 
that the quantitiet; of ore listed "have been produced 
and delivered for sale during the month'' mentioned in 
the affidavit (See Schedule "A," pages 20, 21 and 22). 
As the Schedule recites on page 16: 
"17. Payment of premiums is made by 
Metals Reserve Company upon the basis of an 
affidavit of the producer and a statement by 
Metals Reserve Company's desi,t,rnated agent 
transmitting such affidavit and in support of the 
producer's request for premium payments. Such 
affidavit and statement are required to be made 
on forms prescribed by Metals Reserve Company 
and are as follows : '' 
It is :further argued that the case of Park Utah 
Mining Company illustrates "that the tmbsidy payments 
constitute no part of the sum realized from the sale of 
ore or its conversion into money or its equivalent.'' 
The facts with respect to that mining company are not 
'before this court. We are therefore in no position to 
19 
contradict counsel as to those matters. It however 
appears from the facts related that the Park Utah 
Mining Company received certain B and C premiums and 
in consideration of receiving such premiums agreed 
to a certain expansion program in its mine. But, the 
fact remains that all premiums were paid at a certain 
amount per pound for the metal content of the ores 
prodnced, and the additional expenses incurred in ful-
filling its agreement with the Federal Government were 
deducted hy the mining company before arriving at its 
net proceeds. Certainly, if the 1\'letals Reserve Company 
was willing to increase the purchase price of the ore 
extradc>d by the Park Utah mine, such is no concern 
of the parties involved in this litigation. Nor do we 
see how the Park Utah, if it received a greater amount 
for its ores than some other mining company, can com-
plain merely because such additional sum is included in 
the gross proceeds. The fact that it agreed to and did 
incur additional expenses for development work would 
reduce its "net proceeds'' from which its valuation is 
determined, since cost and expenses of development work 
are deducted from gross proceeds from which a mine's 
valuation is determined. 
Again, the case of the Kennecott Copper Corpora~ 
tion is not before this court for determination. How-
ever, Amici Curiae argue that as to such mining com-
pany subsidy payments "were made not only before a 
pnrehaser had appeared for the copper produced but 
even hPfore there ltad been brought into existence a 
commercial prodnet that was capable of sale". 
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vVe recof,rnize that the premium payments were made 
before Kennecott Copper Corporation disposed of its 
metals, hut before premium payments were made to 
Kennecott, its metals had reached the same stage of 
processing and refining as in the case of ores extracted 
by any other mining company and therefore came within 
the purview of the statute as interpreted in Salt Lake 
County v. Utah Copper Corporatio11, supra. 'T'he 
fact that premium payments were aetually made 
before the metals were disposed of is not indicative 
that such payments were not related to the sale of such 
metals or their value. Opposing counsel are eertainly 
aware of the fact in our present economic strucmrfl: 
that there are numerous instances where "deposits," 
"pre-payments" or "advances" are made prior to the 
sale of a commodity or even its actual production. If 
the mining company is paid for the conmtodity and in 
consideration of its sale, as appears from the affidavits 
filed by the respective mining companies, no complaint 
can be injected into the picture that the money was 
actually received either before or· after the sale was 
consummated. 
It is finally concluded at page 10 of amici curiae's 
brief that the premium price plan was ''closely tied 
in to price fixing during the early days of the plan, but 
later evolved to a condition when development and 
exploration work which might not result in any pro-
duction was a basis for the amounts paid". We recog-
nize that the forepart of this conclusion is correct, but 
insist that the record does not disclose any change or 
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evolution by which the theory of prerrnum payments 
was withdrawn from the realm of price fixing. Notwith-
standing the affidavits filed by the respective mining 
companies recited that the ore containing certain metal 
"had heen produced and delivered for sale" counsel 
try to argue that such premium payments had no 
relationship to a sale or a disposal treated as a sale. 
Nor did the court err in determining that the 
Federal Government had made no attempt to restrict 
the i-)tate of Utah from including the premium payments 
in the amounts received by the mining companies from 
their ores. Opposing counsel take the position that we 
are confronted here with an interpretation of .F'ederal 
statutes and that therefore the decision of Judge John-
son on Odnher 80th, 1944, would he hinding upon this 
court. Those cases referred to on pages 13 and 14 of 
counsel's hrief were finally appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the United States where they were dismissed 
for ]aek of jnri;.;diction on the part of the Federal court 
even to consider the merits of the controversy. And 
in di;.;cussing the nature of the prohlem involved in 
those eases, the Supreme Court made the following 
eomment: 
''It is to be noted that the cases under con-
Hide ration illustrate the disadvantage of deducing 
from equivocal lan6'llage a state's consent to 
Huit in the federal courts on causes of action aris-
ing 1Lnder state tax statutes. The disadvantage 
referred to is that, if the merits were to be 
passed upon, the in-itial interpretation of the 
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meaning and application of a st1ate statute would 
have to be made by a federal court withmd a 
previO'us authoritative interpretation of the stat-
1Ite by the highest court of the stwte. See Spector 
Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 103-105, 
89 L. ed. 101-103, 65 S. Ct. 152." (Italics added.) 
See, Kennecott Copp·er Corporation v. State Tax 
Commission, :~27 U. S. fl73, tl6 S. Ct. 74!'"l, 90 I'· P!l. H62. 
Again, referenee is made by opposing (':mnsel to 
the decision of ,Judg·e Johnson involving th(~ <~pplicaJion 
of the net proeeeds tax D.fl ~:peeifically applyin[~ to the 
Park Utah Consolidated .Mining Company (hereinbefore 
referred to), the Kennecott Copper Corporation and 
others. So that counsel conclude "as a matter of law 
this court is bound by the Federal Government's con-
struction of its own statute:s and is not free to substi-
tute its own opinion as to their construction." Those 
cases referred to have now been decided by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals which followed the decision of this 
court on the theory that the issue involved was one of 
construction of local statutes rather than of Federal 
statutes. We quote from the opinion of the Circuit 
Court of Appeals as follows: 
''One ground of the motions for directed 
verdicts for plaintiffs was that in the taxation of 
the mines and mining claims, the inclusion of 
subsidy · payments in the gross proceeds and 
thence in the net proceeds, as a basis for such 
taxation, was not authorized by the law of Utah. 
That question consumes much space in the briefs 
and it was ably presented on oral argument. 
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The Supreme Court 1of Utah quite. recently oon-
sidered the question and held without qualification 
that in the ta:cation of mines and m.ining claims 
in that state, premium 'Or subsidy paym.ents of 
this kind should be added to twice the 1amount of 
the proceeds received from the sale of the ores 
for the preoeding calendar year as the base for 
such ta:nation. United States Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Co. v. Haynes,- Utah-, 176 Pac. 
(2d) 622. At the same time, the court reached 
a like conclusion in a case involving a closely 
similar question. Combined Metals Reduction Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, -Utah-, 176 Pac. 
(2d) 614. The question before us is ,essentially 
one of Zocal law amd therefore 1these decisions of 
the supreme court of the state ~are oontrrolling." 
(Italics added.) 
In the face of these decisions from the Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, we marvel that anyone should suggest either 
that the question involved is primarily one of con-
struction of Federal statutes and Regulations or that the 
decision of the Federal District court is in any wise 
persuasive that this court has erred in its construction 
of our local taxing statutes. 
Construction of the Utah Statutes: 
With the authorities and statements quoted from 
various cases by Amici Curiae contained in their brief 
at pages 16-25, we have no complaint. The law is well 
settled on the subject of statutory construction. How-
ever the argument referred to on page 27 to the effect 
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that l\;fontmm has determined the point her\~ involved 
adversf'ly to what our court has decided it, is not 
persuasivP that our court was wrong hut that the Mun-
tana c·ourt :n the easf~ of Klies v. Linnane, lf>G Pac. (2d) 
18:3 \Va..., ill wlvised and therefore determined tho question 
improperly. Certainly a cursory reading of the opinion 
in that case would indieatc that the rceonl nn<l files of 
the various Federal Ageneio:s were not hel'or(' the eHurt; 
that it was not aware that the Ofliee of Priet> Admin-
istration had pm-;~;ed a S}l(~eific rcg·nlation exe.lwling pre-
mium paynwnts from the effect of the Prict· Control 
Act so that their paym<~nt \\·ould not eonstitutl· n ,.·iola-
tion of the rep;ulation. 
Nor doet-: tl1c fact that Nevada and ldaho are await-
ing a determination of these cases before proecc<ling to 
onforee their local taxing statutes have any weight 
either for or against tlte contention taken by counsel in 
this case. lt is true that both ,Judge Bronson and ,Judge 
Henderson of the District Court decided thPse caseR 
adversely to the appellants, but in every case before 
the Supreme Court tlte appellant is the one who lost 
the case in the court below. The opinions of those two 
judges are in the record on appeal. There should be little 
comfort to opposing counsel in attempting to persuade 
the Supreme Court that it is in error because it did 
not follow the District Court in these cases. 
Errors claimed in the Present Opinions: 
Counsel take exception to the statement contained 
m the court's opinion that "metals are not paid for 
25 
under settlement contracts unless such metals are sold". 
We reaffirm that such a statement is correct in the light 
of the record in these cases; that all ores on which 
premium payments were applied for by the producer 
actually were "produced and delivered for sale"; and 
that no ore which remained on the dmpp or in the 
mine waf-: considered as a basis for payment of premi-
um:::. Tt is, thc·refore, not true that in some cases the 
,)n~;-; were never sold on which premium payments were 
made. 'l'lw ~tipulation contained in Schedule "A" illu-
strah~s this point when it states that in certain instances 
prelllium p<l}lllents W<'Te made in advanee of the sale 
and in other instances subsequent to the sale. Premium 
pa) rnenh< were a part of the price structure surrounding 
the prndndion and sale of the ores in question. 
Nor do \Ve agree, as con tended hy counsel on page 
>)4 of their brifJ that the effect of the present decision 
is to rewritr) the occupation tax statute. 'Jlhe construction 
given to the taxing statutes by this court in its respective 
opinions gives the only logical and reasonable construc-
tion that <·an he made. 
By way of conclusion, Amici Curjae desire this 
court to give an opportunity for "full re-argument" of 
the eases. Not only have we had the cases before this 
(·onrt, we havr also had two sets of cases before the 
F'ederal eonrts. While some counsel have been involved 
in the cases hcfore this court, otJ1er counsel have been 
involvr1l in the cases before the Federal courts. The 
mining companies had a full opportunity to consolidate 
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all of the cases and appear in the State courts.· Some 
of the companiek refused to do this and conunenced 
their actions in the Federal District court. They have 
had full opportunity to be heard both there and in the 
Circuit Court of Appeals (and in two cases in the 
Supreme Court of the United States). The balance of 
the mining companies have had full opportunity to be 
heard in the State District court and in the Supreme 
Court. We see no reason for granting any re-argument 
of these cases. There is nothing in the court's opinion 
which does not show a careful and full consideration of 
all of the issues involved and a determination in accord-
ance with the more logical interpretation of the taxing 
statutes. 
Apparently Amici Curiae feel ''that the basic error 
into which the court's opinions have fallen is to fail 
to recognize that these cases turn fundamentally on the 
construction of a Federal statute, and not on the con-
struction of a press release." We submit that the 
Federal Court has determined that the issue involved 
here is one of construction of a local taxing statute. 
That alone should be sufficient on which to deny the 
petitions for rehearing. The court's opinion is based 
upon the stipula:t:ed facts. True, some of those facts 
appear from press releases but opposing counsel stip-
ulated that the press releases contained the facts and 
therefore should have no quarrel with this court in 
accepting such statements as the fact. The portions of 
the Stipulation of Facts marked Schedule "A" which 
are not admitted to be facts by the respective parties are : 
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1. The opinion of the Attorney General holding 
the premium payments to be properly included as a 
part of the proceeds from the various ores extracted 
(see pages 34-39) ; 
2. 'fhe memorandum submitted by the mining com-
panies to Charles B. Henderson, Pre::~ident of Metals 
Reserve Company and his reply in response thereto 
(see pages 25-30). 
We have not attempted to persuade this court that 
its opinion was correct because it followed the theory 
of the Attorney General of the State of Utah who by 
law is required to interpret the statutes for the benefit 
of the mxecutive Branch of the Government; but cer-
tainly he should be in a much better position to interpret 
those statutE~s than Charles B. Henderson of Metals 
Reserve Company on whose opinion Amici Curiae heavily 
rely. 
Too, in enumerating the various agencies and courts 
which had passed upon the question, opposing counsel 
also failed to mention that our State Tax Commission, 
after full hearing and argument of all counsel for the 
mining companies as well as counsel for the State of 
Utah, determined the issues adversely to the mining 
companies ~md assessed the taxes which are now upheld 
by this court's decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
From what has been stated herein, as well as in 
previous hriefs filed by appellants, we respeetfully sub-
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mit that the decisions of this court should be sustained 
and a re-hearing of the several cases denied. The 
various causes have been argued thoroughly before each 
of the several tribunals in which they have been pre-
sented. Numerous briefs have been filed and lengthy 
oral arguments presented not only in this court but 
in other courts. There has been no matter presented 
in the petitions for re-hearing which was not thoroughly 
considered by the court an<l disposed of by the opinions 
rendered. No purpose could be served in granting a 
re-hearing in these cases, except to give tht~ respondents 
another opportunity to argue the same points and mat-
ters heretofore presented. 
We earnestly request the Supreme Court to deny 
the petitions for re-hearing. 
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